The Lebanese state's ability to extend its sovereignty north of the Litani River remains closely tied to political will rather than the army's technical capabilities. Reaching an agreement with Hezbollah stands as a major obstacle to the second phase of the plan the army commander intends to present to the government to obtain explicit and official backing for a full-scale military operation.
The targeted area in this phase extends from north of the Litani River to the Awali River at the northern entrance to Sidon, an area estimated at approximately 850 square kilometers. This region includes the vital districts of Jezzine, Sidon-Zahrani, and Nabatieh, making it a strategically crucial area in the Lebanese security equation.
From a military perspective, experts believe the mission in this area appears less complex compared to southern Litani, given its lack of unexploded ordnance and cluster munitions. Furthermore, the army will not have to deploy under direct fire or engage in immediate combat with Israeli forces in this geographical area.
Military sources revealed that the military already possesses nearly complete maps of weapons storage sites and mountain tunnels in the Iqlim al-Tuffah, Kfarhouna, and Jbaa regions. This data is reinforced by logistical and intelligence information received from the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Committee, facilitating access to the identified locations.
The Lebanese army requires two things to carry out this mission: a clear political decision granting it freedom of movement, and sufficient manpower and logistical support. Current information indicates the presence of only one brigade and a limited number of regiments in the area, which is insufficient to deal with the scale of the deployed weaponry without additional reinforcements.
Military circles estimate that the process of seizing and disposing of the weapons could take between six and nine months, provided the necessary resources are available. However, the question remains as to whether Hezbollah is willing to grant its full and public consent to these sovereign measures.
Reports indicate that Hezbollah still retains approximately 15% of its stockpile of precision ballistic missiles, in addition to an arsenal of drones and short-range missiles. This military presence north of the Litani River increases the sensitivity of the issue domestically and makes it a key topic of regional and international discussion regarding border security.
The funding crisis presents another obstacle, as the international community appears hesitant to provide financial and military support before seeing tangible progress in implementing the arms control plan. The postponement of the preparatory conference to support the army, originally scheduled for mid-February, has further increased uncertainty regarding the timing of the arrival of much-needed aid.
Conversely, Israeli military pressure and repeated incursions further complicate the security situation north of the Litani River, leaving the state with two equally unpalatable options: either to expedite internal agreements to consolidate state authority and avoid escalation, or to adopt a rigid political stance that could perceive any action as a response to external pressure.
The North Litani test essentially represents a test of the Lebanese state's ability to monopolize the use of force and shift security decisions from a balance of power to one of sovereignty. It also reflects the extent to which political forces, particularly Hezbollah, are willing to fully engage in political action outside the framework of independent military and security structures.
